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AN APPROACH TO THE NATURAL LAW
GODFREY P. SCHMIDTt
THE basic presupposition of the natural law' is also the basic pre-
supposition of all science and, indeed, of all intelligibility. Reality
and order exist and can be known to us. It matters not that we do not
understand how reality is known. That it is and can be known is a
direct datum of consciousness and an indispensible prerequisite to all
science, theory, practice, and even consciousness. For consciousness
implies affirmation and reality. It implies a revelation, an intuition, a
clarity and evidence, a union of subject and object in a confrontation
or communion that is sui generis. Shut the door on this initial realiza-
tion and we cannot even think, for thought requires an object. The
idealist and subjectivist necessarily assume the very thing they deny:
the objective validity of the knowing process. They are satisfied that
we know ideas, percepts, internal states. They deny we know or can
know extramental reality; at least they claim to be agnostics in this
respect. They could not even pose their problem unless they admitted
at least by implication the validity of knowledge. Only in virtue of that
validity can they say they know ideas, percepts, internal states. If the
knowledge process is competent to assure them of the reality of these
things, why not of other things?
Centuries ago Aristotle began his work on Physics with this language:
"When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles,
conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowl-
edge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not
think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary con-
ditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its
simplest elements." -
* Lecturer in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. "In the beginning God, acting with Supreme Intelligence, created all things according
to a Divine Plan. That Plan is the Eternal Law. Man, endowed by his Creator with an
immortal soul, an intellect and a free will, can ascertain the primary dictates of the Eternal
Law by his own reason, apart from direct Revelation. Such dictates thus made known,
together with the inferences flowing rationally from them, constitute the Natural Law."
Prospectus, ME= NATURAL LAw INsTuTE 1 (University of Notre Dame College of Law,
December 9 and 10, 1949).
2. AarsTornr, PnvsicA I, i; Ross, TAE Woans op Ausrorx (1930).
1
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
Either there is a cosmos or everything is chaos. There could be no
natural law and no science if there were no order.' On the assumption
that things and human beings are all afflicted with a radical contingency
so that they simply exist but can never be known even imperfectly,
science would be meaningless.4 If human morality is dependent upon
some decree devoid of reason, excluding every sort of finality, the dis-
tinction between the good and the bad, the just and the unjust would
be impenetrable.
Today natural law doctrine suffers assault from many quarters but
especially from positivism,' pragmatism,6 voluntarism7 and existen-
tialism.8 To a certain extent both pragmatism and positivism have a
3. Order is the unity of many things arranged under a certain aspect or pattern.
DONAT, S.J., ONTOLOGIA (1921); BROTHER BENIGNUS, NATURE, KNOWLEDOE AND GOD 497
(1947); CoFFEY, ONTOLOGY 199 (1918).
4. Of course, such a position cannot be taken without self-contradiction. Why should
I trust the deliverances of my knowing process, when it tells me that I or something exists
and then immediately and inconsistently distrust the same knowing process when It tells
me about the modalities of existing things; e.g., this is larger than that; the elephant Is
different from the mouse. Bertrand Russell assumes certain positions which he summarizes
as follows: "The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this (the reality of
orderliness in the external world) is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps,
without unity, without continuity, without coherence, or orderliness or any of the proper-
ties that governesses love." RUSS.LL, SCIENTnFC OuTLoox 94 (1931). On this hypothesis
of self-torment and futility there is no such a thing as knowledge. Russell's effusion Is,
of course, merely the counterattack made upon a straw man. As if it were possible to
explain the meaning of "caprice" and "whim" without resort to the concept of order
by contrast with which caprice and whim are alone definable. Russell does more than
deny all evidence and reality. He provides us with skids for slipping into scepticism and
despair. No wonder, in an earlier work, that he had written: "Brief and powerless Is
man's life. On him and all his race, the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to
good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way."
RUSSELL, A FREE MAN's WoRSaIP 46 (1918). But on his own showing, how does Russell
know anything about matter? How does he know that it is omnipotent? How does he
know that it rolls on any way, to say nothing of a relentless way?
5. Positivism is the theory which reduces all scientific knowledge to a knowledge of
facts in so far as they are obtainable and verifiable by the so-called "scientific method".
See RUNES, DICTIONARY or PHosopY 243 (1942).
6. Pragmatism is the idea that the true is only the expedient according to our way of
thinking, and that the right is only the expedient in our way of behaving. JnAMS, PRAo-
mATISm 53, 222 (1925); DRscoLL, PRAGMATISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE IDEA (1915).
7. Voluntarism is the doctrine which over-emphasizes or gives primacy to the role of
the will in the acquisition of knowledge or certitude. Dore, The Human Right and The Law,
15 FORD. L. REv. 3 (1946).
8. Existentialism is speculation which pretends to arrive at a "phenomenology of
existence". It seeks to concern itself with existence without being and intellect. It en-
deavors to derive conclusions from the sensation of existence cut off from intellect. It
constitutes a denial of metaphysics and of the true value of such objects of thought as
being, equality, similarity, etc. See Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, PONICAL INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 152 (1949).
AN APPROACH TO THE NATURAL LAW
proper but limited contribution to make toward the development and
understanding of natural law doctrine. Positivism with its emphasis
upon what is and what exists furnishes the empirical starting point for
natural law speculation. Pragmatism, by its preoccupation with the
adage: "By their fruits you will know them," endows the natural law
in its application to what St. Thomas Aquinas called "determinations",I
with a wholesome humility and with a realization that men's moral
judgments are often fallible.
But the most pernicious onslaught against natural law doctrine comes
from voluntarism and existentialism. Indeed as Jacques Maritain has
shown in the introduction to his recent book entitled, Existence and the
Existant,° voluntarism and modern existentialism are related. They are
related because modern existentialism is in a very real sense the offspring
of the libertistic or voluntaristic metaphysical systems of men like
Descartes"l and Duns Scotus.' 2 The God of these systems is an Existence
devoid of any nature. In these systems essences and intelligibles are
arbitrarily created. 3 They are free from every order of wisdom. In
them eternal verities are really pure contingents. They are not dependent
on God's immutable essence. They are contingent upon His Will. For
such a God there is no order of finality.
"This is why he would have been able to create mountains without
valleys, square circles, and contradictions, both of which were equally
true."'
4
Some merely verbal exponents of the natural law have been rendering
it a vast disservice. They have conceived of the natural law as if it
were based upon a philosophy of mere essences or a dialectic of mere
ideas or conceptualisms.'0 Actually the authentic philosophy behind the
9. ST. TMoar.s AQu-nAs, SunsIA THEOLOGICA I-Il, 95, 2.
10. MARrrAiy, Coutr TRA= DR L'ExsExcE ET DE L'EX.sTA,r 4 (Galantier and Phelan
transl. (1948)).
11. Descartes seems to have held that the truth of the principle of contradiction and
the truth of the first principles of morality depend upon the divine freedom, so that God,
had He so chosen, could have willed to make all that we now know as truth error and
all error, as we recognize it now, truth by a different kind of creation. See Corn,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 96.
12. 2 DEWuL=, HSTORy OF MEDmLEvA. PH IosoPHY 78 (1926).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. MArrinl, CouRT TRAns DE L'ExI-ENCE T DE I'E.xe.sTlT S (Galantier and Phelan
transl. (1948)).
15. "The idea is abstract, that is, disengaged from the concrete spatio-temporal condi-
tions that characterize every corporeal object. . . . If the idea were a concrete content
of consciousness, determined . .. here and now .. . it could not be universal, that is,
capable of being shared by an indefinite series of objects. The operation of abstraction
consists essentially in seizing in a datum of experience either the value of being or reality,
or some particular mode of this value, a mode of being, actuality, and essence ...
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natural law doctrine is the philosophy of being, of existence and of
existential realism.16 The deepest well spring of true natural law doctrine
is a docile willingness on the part of intellect to be confronted with
the act of existing. In other words, the natural law is only to be found
in the context of a veritable existentialism as distinguished from the
modern, usually atheistic, type of existentialism. 7
There is no avenue of escape for science, philosophy or indeed any
kind of knowledge if man is imprisoned in a universe of existents which
are unknowable, unthinkable, indefinable, inexplicable. In such a world
the terrible responsibility for truth and for the values we live by con-
stitutes a crushing burden under which man is agoniied, helpless and
hopeless. Despite all deluding appearances, such a world is unordered
and chaotic.'"
In such a disorder (it cannot be called a world), the relatively lucid
realities and finalities of the natural law discoverable from man as a
microcosm within the macrocosm do not exist. Instead we have the kind
of depressing picture that Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness,
describes. 9 The sheer voluntarism and atheism of Sartre's position is
"The fact of abstraction characterizes our human knowledge. . . .On the side of experi-
ence it implies that the datum really possesses the values which the subject discovers
in it.. . ." VAN STEENBEROEN, EPIsTOEOLOGY 136 (1949).
16. MARITAIN, CouRT TRAITE DE L'ExIsTENcE ET DE L'EXISTANT (Galantier and Phelan
transl. (1948)). See also MiUTAin, DEGREES OF KNOWLEoGE (1938); Gilson, Being and
Some Philosophers, PONTmCAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIEs (1949).
17. MARrTAIn, COuRT TRAITE DE L'EXIsTENCE ET DE L'EXISTANT 3 (Galantier and Phelan
transl. (1948)).
18. "Accordingly, the first prerequisite of an unalterable, permanent, standard natural
law is the possibility of a knowledge of being, of a knowledge of the essences of things;
in other words, a realistic epistemology or theory of knowledge. . . ." RonmtN, Tim
NATURAL LAW 163 (1947).
19. "The fact is, I am engaged in a world of values. The anguished apperception
of value is sustained in being by my liberty .... I am writing, I am going to smoke, I have
an appointment tonight. . . . All these small passive expectations of the real, all these
trite and everyday values, draw their meaning in fact from a first projection of myself
which is, as it were, my choice of myself in the world. But, to speak precisely, this
projection of myself toward a first possibility, which brings it about that there are values,
appeals, expectations, and in general, a world, does not appear except beyond the world
as the abstract and logical sense and significance of my undertaking. For the rest there
are, concretely, alarm clocks, sign boards, tax returns, policemen-so many barriers against
dread. But as soon as the undertaking fails me, as soon as I am sent back to myself
because I must await myself in the future, I suddenly find myself to be the one who
gives its meaning to the alarm clock, who forbids himself, at the instance of a sign board,
to walk on a flower bed or a lawn, who lends its urgency to the chief's order, who decides
on the interest of the book he is writing, who brings it about, finally, that values exist
to determine his actions by their exigency. I emerge alone and in dread in the face of
the unique and first project which constitutes my being; all the barriers, all the realings,
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manifest. Reality is what I in my freedom and liberty make it. Nothing
more. There is no natural law. No pattern or rational situation to
restrict my sheer liberty. Things simply exist. They have no determi-
nate nature. It must follow that they lack finality. A chaos of existing
things without essences cannot even be conceived. Without specific
natures, things cannot exist; they cannot constitute an ordered universe.
Yet the natural law, like all science, presupposes an ordered universe.
In an ordered universe things indeed exist. But they exist in a particular
way. They have their own natures and their own finalities, by which
they fit into the plan of that ordered universe and by which they are
knowledgeable. Natural law speculation starts with the intuition that
man does not stand lonely outside the plan of the ordered universe,
wherein all things else tend to their ends according to their particular
modalities of being. A scientist looks for causes and laws because at
bottom he believes in the fundamental intelligibility of reality. He starts
from the principle of sufficient reason.20 He knows that an atom and
a cat are different because each has a mode of being and acting peculiar
to its nature. As Father Stanley Bertke put it, "To deny that man has
a mode of action peculiar to his nature is to deny the principle of finality,
the doctrine of specific differences, and ultimately, the principle of
sufficient reason. Evidently, if man has no action proper to himself by
which he tends toward the end his specific nature demands, no sufficient
reason can be adduced for his being. In other words, man like all other
creatures, must tend to his end according to laws bound up with his
very nature. He must have a natural law."2'
Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr. in the beginning of his American Inter-
pretations of Natural Law, observed that, "although natural law is one
of the oldest and one of the most frequently used political concepts, it
is also one of the most difficult of analysis and definition."" Genuine
natural law doctrine like all vital truths necessarily reflects inadequately
(but not for that reason erroneously) the mystery of being and exist-
ence.as Because this doctrine is a stateiment made by intelligence con-
collapse, annihilated by the consciousness of my liberty; I have not, nor can I have,
recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who maintain values in being; nothing
can assure me against myself; cut off from the world and my essence by the nothing
that I am, I have to realize the meaning of the world and of my essence: I decide it
alone, unjustifiable, and without excuse." SARTRE, BiNG AND NOTncGrFss 76 (194S).
20. This principle can be put in a number of ways all conveying the same meaning:
Whatever exists has a sufficient reason for existing. Anything which is, to the extent that
it is, possesses a sufficient reason of its being. Whatever is, is intdligibly determined. What-
ever is has that whereby it is. FAn,. A PREFACE TO METAHYSICS 99 (1939).
21. BERT, THE PossiBrr=R or INvmCmLE ImooRAic or TAE NATuRAL Mw 15 (1941).
22. WRiGHT, AimaCAN INTERPRETATIONS or NATURAL LAWe 3 (1931).
23. In this connection, the words "existing", "existence", "being" and "real" involve
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fronting reality with its bottomless reaches of knowability there never
will be a facile, final and definitive statement of the natural law doctrine.
The realities out of which natural law knowledge emanates can always
be plumbed more profoundly. But, if our knowledge of this law is
always subject to greater and greater refinement, it does not follow that
what we have already learned authentically must always be disestab-
lished by what we shall learn hereafter. Truth is not rendered obsolete
by the passage of time. It abides forever. Only what is improperly
called truth can be refuted.
Moreover to the description of what they perceive in reality, some
men bring greater insight than others. Some have greater perseverance
and patience. Some are humbler and more docile before reality.
The far-reaching recurrence of the natural law tradition itself suggests
that the establishment of the natural law is an implication from the
creation of human nature. Human beings not only exist, they exist in
a particular way, with a specific nature. A rudimentary knowledge of
the law of that nature comes easily and universally to men. It is a
knowledge by connaturality, sympathy or inclination. As a datum to be
analyzed and known, as a nature, man can be known only in a particular
way, by means of a specific essence. The nature and essence of man
is discerned from living, throbbing, existing men. Man has a capacity
for knowing himself as structured; as set in a pattern of being and
acting. This is the same as saying that he has a capacity for reading
the "law" by which he lives. That "law" is the message of the Law-giver.
And the Law Giver is the Nature-Maker, God.
Today the most radical challenge to these intuitions and inductions
is presented by the school of atheistic existentialism. It denies the
natural law because it denies that anything can have a nature as the
source of its acts and finalities or an essence as the reliable sign of our
(limited) knowledge of nature.
What is the intellectual process by which a defensible notion of the
natural law can be acquired? To my mind the best approach is by
means of some relatively simple material existent.
Let us assume that we have before us a wooden toothpick. This thing,
of definite form, color and dimensions, even a primitive from some
benighted society would recognize as a "something". But he might
wonder what it was and what it was for. Ontologically, it is the same
thing or existent whether it be regarded by a' barbarian, a philosopher
or a scientist. Yet this simple and silent reality (a definite something,
the same essential meaning. They cannot be defined because nothing is simpler or clearer
than "being". Whatever is defined must be defined in terms of "being" or "the real";
or in terms of a determination of being. In this sense, logical being, such as the abstract
idea or the universal, is merely a modality of being.
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to be contrasted with nothing), which can be clutched in the fist of any
baby, yields messages of varying import to different inquisitive minds.
To probing intelligences it, as it were, "says" things-many things-
without using words or formal explanation of any kind. All of us are
too intellectually limited to apprehend everything that this little wooden
object "says" without words. But no sane person will be so obtuse as
to be unable to catch some of these unworded sayings. Judgments and
aperqus will depend upon the interest and the competence of the one
who is confronted by the toothpick. For example, to the interested
merchant or salesman, the toothpick suggests a more or less valuable
ware. The connoisseur of woods, scrutinizing it, reads its telltale appear-
ance in order to learn that it is made of pine. The chemist probes it
for a message concerning its chemical nature as an organic compound
made up of specific ultimate elements. The histologist who renders his
ocular vision more acute by using a microscope, lets its cellular struc-
ture "talk" to him. A physicist might find in it an epiphany of the
atomic constitution of matter. A geometer might study its form until
it enunciates the mathematical laws of its shape. For an engineer it
would exhibit a certain tensile strength. Each man from the background
of his own knowledge and experience draws from it a different lesson.
Yet for each specialist it is this simple toothpick, considered as an
existing reality, which is pregnant with meanings and messages. Only
by some sort of confrontation, that puts intellect in the presence of the
existing thing, is that meaning or message made out. The toothpick is
considered as something to be known in itself, as a nature, a core of
knowability, an object of knowledge.
Indeed so many and so various are the messages which an ordinary
toothpick exhibits, that not even the wisest and most informed savant
or scientist of our century can read or understand all of them. 4 A yokel
24. "In the first place my explicit knowledge of the real is limited by my exparince,
and although I glimpse the possibility of indefinite progress in the enrichment of this
experience, I have no grounds for thinking that a time will come when I -hall have
acquired an explicit knowledge of everything which exists....
"In the second place the objectivity of my knowledge--the conscious possession of the
real as it is in itself-is not perfect under every respect. Indeed, this possession is achieved
in and by an act which is immanent to the subject, and therefore follows the 'mode' or
'capacity' proper to the subject (cognitum est in cognoscente ad Modunr cognoscentis).
"As a knowing subject, I manifest certain peculiar traits which endanger somewvhat the
perfect objectivity of my knowledge. These peculiar traits are my recourse to corporeal
organs as instruments of knowledge and the abstract character of my synthetic repre-
sentation. The first of these characteristics causes the essential relativity of sensible 'quali-
ties, while the second introduces a 'conceptual dissection' and unavoidable inadequacy
into my representation of concrete reality." VAT STr-xDEaoamn, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 246.
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might consider that he had exhausted the knowability of a toothpick
by referring merely to its usefulness as a means for dislodging food
caught between the teeth. But a person whom education or experience
had rendered more cautious and more humble knows that this little wisp
of wood has undreamed-of potentialities and uses, depending upon
ingenuity and necessity. So far as we know it is potentially a source of
unlimited knowledge. It is also a potential tool or means proportioned
to many practical purposes. It might serve as a needle or a peg; an
applicator or a more or less fragile lever; etc. Apart from the primary
use for which it was invented and manufactured it has many possible
and incidental uses. These incidental uses are not limited by the possible
meager knowledge or narrow intention of the maker or inventor of the
toothpick. Rather they depend upon the constitution or nature of
the thing made; its particular form, its properties, its notes and
characteristics.
What is noteworthy in this connection is that it could not be put to
any possible use, whether primary and intended or incidental and per-
haps unintended, unless it conveyed a message of some kind to intelli-
gence. It could never serve any purpose unless it were a something, a
nature and an essence (apart from being, and in addition to being, an
existing thing). It could not exist except as a nature. No man could
use it unless it were knowable to some extent in addition to being in
existence. The man who wishes to employ it for some end must know it
and not only that it exists. He must be able to recognize it as a quiddity
distinguishable by a constellation of particular attributes or properties.
The annunciation it makes to particular persons might be scant or
negative. For example that a toothpick can't be used to make a golden
ring; that it can't serve the purpose of a G-string on a mandolin. In
other words there are some uses of a toothpick which even a man who
had never seen a toothpick before and who never understood its pri-
mary purpose would avoid. Why? The thing itself is an apocalypse-
it exhibits and explains its own nature, its primary and other finalities
to a greater or a less degree; it interdicts disproportioned uses and pur-
poses according to the acumen and shrewdness of the person who studies
it or handles it. The nature and purpose or purposes of a toothpick are
nevertheless intimately related. That is why we say that a toothpick
"ought" not be used for some purposes.
Let us take a second example to illustrate that you never really know
what a thing is unless you know what it is for. A South American
native from the headwaters of the Magdafena River might find a Stillson
wrench and consider it a good weapon. I suppose even plumbers (who
presumably know better) have used Stillson wrenches for weapons.
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Nevertheless the primary purpose of the Stillson wrench is to grip and
to turn (and thus tighten) round pipes or rods into sockets or elbows.
There is only one "proper" or "good" use of a Stillson wrench in
the sense of the use intended by its maker. All other uses are incidental,
somehow lacking propriety or suitability when compared with the use
intended by the inventor of the wrench. I do not say that these other
uses lack efficiency for other purposes. Obviously a wrench may by its
very construction and form be efficient for many purposes not intended
by an inventor who lacks omniscience. Maybe a Stillson wrench would
be a better paper weight than many of the things that are sold as paper
weights today.
The incidental uses of things like Stillson wrenches or toothpicks are
a function of the ingenuity and imagination of the men who seek to
put them to those uses. But here there is no question of imagination
run riot. The imagination or ingenuity in question is guided by the
thing itself considered as a disclosure. No one but a lunatic would
think of using a Stillson wrench as a cornet. There are fantastically
improbable and impossible "uses" for things. Those uses are not merely
dependent upon an exercise of my freedom and liberty. Mere volun-
tarism makes no contribution here. Use means choice of means for
an end. That is always a work of reason and intellect as well as of will.
That is why sound intellectualism confronts itself with existing reality
and is guided by the objective contours and characteristics of that
reality. The latter as a form'- or nature avows and divulges itself (to
intellect) as suitable to this or that end.
What is it then which guides a man in putting a thing like a toothpick
or a Stillson wrench to one or the other of its manifold possible, inci-
dental uses, as distinguished from its primary use (i.e., the one intended
by its maker). Obviously it is the thing itself, its nature, its structure,
its form, its qualities, its properties. If a Stillson wrench were as light
as a feather it would never be thought of as having efficiency as a paper
weight, even if it could still be used as an instrument for twisting pipes.
Even where a toothpick substitutes for a peg, a person of intelligence
25. "When I see a tree, I am aware of a complex of shape and color. This complex
is the character of the tree as I experience it. It is a nature, a thusness. But the very
fact that I am compelled to think of it as the nature, character or thusness of an object,
in this case a tree, proves that I am not and cannot be aware of a character by itself,
a nature which is not the nature of a particular thing. . . . A nature or character must
be the nature or character of something. . . . The form-the character, thusness-may
actually belong to a host of concrete objects and is as such capable of an indefinite number
of individual embodiments." WAT=J, A Pnrrosopuv or FoRm 3 (1935).
"... As M. Meyerson has shown, we do not experience a chaotic multiplicity, simul-
taneous and successive, but objects possessing a definite character common to many
others.... This character ... is form." Id. at 84.
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does not expect it to sustain the weight which a metal nail of comparable
size might sustain.
Thus the thing itself in some way "speaks" to the inquiring mind and
"tells" it of its uses and potentiality; and of the law of its internal
and external structural capacities. It is the thing itself which by a kind
of passive confession of itself dictates to our minds how that thing can
be used, adapted, abused or destroyed. No man can know its possibilities
without examining it or studying it. It is not enough to read its defini-
tion in a dictionary. Nor is it enough to have someone merely explain
its primary use. There is no substitute for having the thing itself as an
existent before you if you want to investigate some of its primary or inci-
dental uses or functions. Having studied the thing in that way, without
further formal education from any other source you have derived from it
certain knowledge more or less accurate, more or less extensive.
We often come upon realities which we have never seen before. For
the moment I continue to confine my attention to artifacts. No matter
how complicated the product of human art, if a man made it (even
though he tried to keep its nature and purpose secret) the thing itself
will eventually lay bare its own secret of construction and purpose to
minds of adequate ingenuity and competence. 6
Experts may be able to find all the meaning and significance which
man has been able to hide or to insert in material things. But material
things contain secrets and knowabilities which men did not put there.
26. During the war the Germans were the first to develop the so-called magnetic bomb.
They sent no letter of instruction regarding its mechanism or purpose. On the contrary,
they tried, so far as humanly possible, to keep its structure a secret. If this could be done,
its explosion would always be something against which no effective counter-measures
could be taken.
Structurally the magnetic bomb was a series of subordinate mechanical, electrical and
chemical means directed to an ultimate end: the detonation of powerful explosives for the
destruction of shipping. It was a complicated mechanism delicately adjusted: a maze of
sub-assemblies all functionally related to a primary explosive function and purpose. In a
relatively short time, however, Allied experts unraveled its secret. What was the method
of discovery? The Allied experts read a "real" (the word comes from the Latin word rcs,
thing) communique written into the very structure of the thing itself. Certainly this
message was in no printed book or memorandum of instruction. It was in the ingenious
internal and external complexity of the thing itself. The magnetic bomb exemplified a
specific internal and external pattern or form. As an existent, it had to have a form or
nature or pattern, by which it could be known and betrayed. Some very obvious and
elementary messages will be carried even to incompetent people if they simply look at the
magnetic bomb externally. They know for example that it cannot ("ought not") be used
for a basketball because it is too heavy, and too large. But it took the right combination
of docility training and insight to learn from the magnetic bomb itself its rationale. The
bomb was the "teacher". It is the student who is always the principal and efficient cause of
learning. The teacher is only the instrumental cause.
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For the moment I am not concerned with how they came to be there
at all. All I am trying to emphasize is that such secrets and knowabilities
often defy human shrewdness more than the things that men, by their
science and art, write into the materials they use when they make some-
thing. The things made by human art are always materialized ideas,
embodied forms. We had a certain amount of security in our real or
imagined exclusive possession of the atomic bomb. But such security in
the long range is precarious precisely because ideas have a way of leap-
ing out of material embodiments. What men have been clever enough
to devise, other men may independently invent, discover or copy.
Uranium 235, whether isolated by man or "made" by man (out of other
materials which man did not make) conveys intelligible signals to all
minds, but only some scientists have the learning and the genius to
read them.
Likewise the facility or difficulty which men experience in reading the
legenda embedded in the things made by men depends upon the industry
and talent of the reader. The communication capable of discernment
is always there behind a thicker or thinner corporeal veiling. Moreover,
it is always there in the same way while the thing itself remains the same.
That is another way of saying that the thing has a specific nature which
is differentiable from other natures.
Everything made by human art and technology bears the imprint of
some rudimentary or refined rational process. The clockmaker puts his
particular brand of rationality, the hallmark of his intellectual calcula-
tions, into his clock. Most men look at a clock or even take it apart
without fully understanding its calculus of rationality.
It is the mark of wide penetration of civilization and culture and
the token of art and technology that the refractory raw materials of
nature are extensively and ingenuously impressed with the mold and the
pattern of intellect and reason. The very earth is scarred with these
marks of designing men. The fields that lie fallow are contrasted with
the fields that are evenly furrowed by the plowshare. Where man the
engineer has left his signature, there are bridges across rivers and steel
skeletons bearing the stony skin of skyscrapers. In athletics, we find
flesh and blood formed to the "second nature" of skillful habit. Habitu-
ation means facility of intended and studied movement; mind domi-
nating muscle: so that the racquet will drive the ball this side of a white
line; so that coordinated motions of the foot can send the pigskin over
the horizontal bar of the goalposts. In the fine arts the arrangement of
form and color (working as it were against the grain of pigments or
marble) creates this or that copy of nature. In steel production, the
scrunching of the blooming mill or of the finishing mill which gives a
desired intellectual form to the rebellious ingots from the "soaking pits".
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No matter where one goes in modern or ancient civilization or culture
one is constantly confronted with the things men have moulded according
to the matrix of mind; with the material things poured, as it were, into
the intellectual containers of ideas which confer upon those things their
"form"; with things fitted to the pattern of man's rationalities. Every
one of these man-made things is a specific nature, a concrete reality;
an existent which carries from its maker its unique conception and
confession of itself. For all art and all making constitutes the relatively
commonplace process of putting the evangel of mind and thought into
things which thereby become natures, substances with phenomenal clus-
ters of notes and properties; quiddities which only as such can be dis-
criminated from other things. As specific things they are not the mere
toys of unrestrained human liberty and freedom. They are realities
which internally and externally express the law of their production.
For production always begins with ideas and the thing produced always
bears the trade-mark of its genesis and of its original merely intentional
being.
The method of proceeding from the existence of artifacts to a knowl-
edge of their laws, causes, designs and purposes is analogous to the
scientific method, where man deals with realities he has not made.
Let us understand the scientific method in order to appreciate its
analogies with the "natural law" of artifacts. Again the foundation is
epistemology or the theory of knowledge. "The method of science does
not seek to impose the desires and hopes of men upon the flux of things
in a capricious manner. It may indeed be employed to satisfy the
desires of men. But its successful use depends upon seeking, in a delib-
erate manner, and irrespective of what men's desires are, to recognize
as well as take advantage of the structure which the flux possesses.
"1. Consequently, scientific method aims to discover what the facts
truly are, and the use of the method must be guided by the discovered
facts....
"2. . . . no inquiry can get under way unless some selection or sifting
of the subject matter has taken place. ...
"3. The ability to formulate problems whose solution may also help
solve other problems is a rare gift, requiring extraordinary genius....
"4. The 'facts' for which every inquiry reaches out are propositions
for whose truth there is considerable evidence. ...
Professors Lindsay and Margenau in their advanced textbook write:
"We shall at once assume the possibility of experience and knowledge
27. COHEN AND NAGEL, INTRODUCTION To LOGIC AND SCIENTMC METHODS 391 (1934)
(italics supplied).
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as the metaphysical basis upon which any science fundamentally rests.
Moreover, we shall accept the genuineness of the sense-perceptions of
normal people.... We must also grant the possibility of the exchange
of knowledge .... ,2
Professor W. R. Thompson is the last witness I cite in this connection:
"The basis of science, or at least of the sciences of observation upon
which the whole of the scientific structure reposes is, nevertheless, essen-
tially realist. The sciences of observation assume the fundamental truth-
fulness of the view of nature presented by the senses. Furthermore,
science takes for granted the intelligibility of things-what Meyerson
calls 'the reasonableness of reality'."21
Thus the scientist confronted with the stars, the earth, the planetary
system, the fact of motion, chemical elements, radio-active materials, etc.,
does nothing more than try to "read" (observe) these things. He is
not satisfied to know that they exist. He wants to know what they are
and what they do. In other words he wants to know their natures or
at least the natures of their actions, properties or phenomena. He tries
to take hold of Nature in so far as natures are intelligible. True, a
certain unintelligible residue is ever left behind (to serve as the subject
matter or the potentiality for further knowledge); especially since sci-
ence deals with proximate causes.
Such considerations exhibit the fundamental similarity between the
scientific method and the method of making artifacts speak by virtue of
the imprint on them of intelligibility. Discard the notion that the things
with which the scientist is concerned have a knowable content, whose
apocalypse is the business of mind observing those things, and you take
away the possibility of science.
The great questions of epistemology are no more nor less important
for science than for ethics and the natural law. There can be no intelli-
gible synthesis of natural phenomena as a science unless the realities
known to science by these phenomena were specific natures, with deter-
minate properties and attributes amenable to intellectual apprehension.
Whitehead saw this when he wrote: ".... there can be no living science
unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of
an Order of Things, and, in particular, of an Order of Nature.'30 In
another place, he uses the words "pattern" and "patterns of assemblage"
to signify this order or Order.3 '
28. LxDsAY AN I) ARGENAU, Foumi.AnoNs Or Pesics 1 (1936).
29. THOZXPS0N, ScIE.NCE AN) CoIImoN SF-qsE 14 (1937).
30. WHMHEAD, SCMNCE AND THE MODMEN WORMU 5 (1926). See Tnoiuisonw, ScmCE
AND Commov SENSE (1937); NoRTH oP, ScIE EC AND FiSr PCIPLES (1932); Sm=EN,
PHmosoPBy OF ScIEcE 56 (1934).
31. WHrrEHEAD, EsSAYS IN SCIENCE AND PHmosoPiry 71, 81, 83 (1948).
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St. Thomas Aquinas, in the beginning of his Commentary on Aristotle's
Nichomachaean Ethics distinguishes four orders as follows:
1. The order which reason by its deliberations effects in external
things (artifacts produced by purposeful human activity) pertains to
the arts.
2. There is an order (and therefore a law) of things which human
reason merely discovers but does not create. This is the order of science
and the order of metaphysics.
3. The order (of logic) is a third kind of order which reason by its
deliberation achieves in its own proper act.
4. Finally there is an (ethical) order which reason by deliberation
effects in the operations of the will. Here, in some respects, is the most
refractory material in the world: man's conduct. A man is civilized or
uncivilized, good or bad, according to the manner in which he constrains
to the pattern of reason this very refractory material. 2
The cultured man, the good man, is precisely the man who has taken
the refractory materials that well into consciousness (his desires, his
axmbitions, his aspirations, his untamed velleities) and has placed upon
them the restraining discipline of rationality; just as a farmer takes the
weed grown field and converts it into a crop of rye or corn; or the car-
penter who takes the trunk of a tree and makes of it a mast or a beam.
All civilization is implicit with an architectonic rationalism, the myriad
fossils of reason, which man has buried in things and in himself. The
process of becoming educated is merely the process of realizing, often
against the grain, the potentialities (of nature) which constitute our
substantial mystery. How does man come to know the order discover-
able in reality?
With regard to artifacts, there are three obvious ways of learning
what a thing is and what it is for.
(1) We may go to the maker of the thing and make inquiry of him.
(2) We may go to an expert other than the maker.
(3) We may go to the thing itself and by a careful study of the
nature and properties of that thing, deduce the revelation inherent in it.
Modern science, which deals with Nature as an ensemble of natures
not made by man, uses the second and third methods exclusively. Since
it deals with proximate causes it takes only the first steps in the direction
of the Maker; that is to say, in the direction of the First Cause.
Religion, by virtue of Revelation, is concerned primarily with the
first of these three methods. But in the Church and in the Prophets, in
the Apostles and their successors it concerns itself with the second meth-
32. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, III, 4; STEwAT, TEMPLES oF ETrERNntY V (1931).
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od, too. In using philosophy as its handmaiden,' religion also employs
the third method. Philosophy is absorbed in the third method.
A fine craftsman and wise inventor or maker writes competently and
lucidly into and with the very structure or nature of the things which
he has made. By and with the thing itself he writes an "account" of
the quiddity and purpose of that thing.
In the natural law tradition man himself is considered as a thing made.
He has a Primary and secondary maker. The Primary Maker is God
as Creator. The secondary maker is the man himself who "builds
himself" (realizing or disappointing his potentialities) by his deliberate
choices. Just as a man can build his body into a set of good or bad
habits which will determine his "form" in playing golf, so a man, by
habits of a specific kind, can build his will and intellect into a form which
is deficient by evil or fulfilled by good.
Men like St. Thomas Aquinas have applied the elementary and homely
truths, procedures and considerations set forth above to that strange
creature called homo sapiens as well as to the things that man makes
and to the things of Nature that man discovers. Obviously the scientist
did not make the sun nor the stars. Yet from a study of them he gleans
the rationality and order discoverable in their natures and operations.
The physicist has neither made nor even seen an electron. But he has
reasoned to the existence and nature of electrons because he has pieced
together the puzzle of appearances. In some way or another things con-
front his intelligence so as to be comprehensible by him. The biologist
and physiologist did not make the human nervous system nor the blood
streams which extend throughout the human anatomy. The men who
first learned about the nature and finality of these things,-the men who
are learning more about them today-,are all men who use as their
"book" the structure of the human body. It is the "natural law" of that
body that they are writing down in their treatises on anatomy and
physiology.
All science starts with the cosmos as an objective, decipherable order.
By a difficult and sometimes disappointing surgery the scientist lays
bare, little by little, the sinews of a rationality that permeates this frame
of things. The generalizations and laws of science are nothing more
than statements of an order indicative of rationality. The Maker did
not personally stand beside the scientist to explain. No expert, prophet
or archangel demonstrated the scientific verities to those who blazed the
trails. They had only one "document" to go by: the so-called "book
of nature". Reality is fertile with many readings. That is why we try
33. O-wiAm-ZYBURA, TnE KEY To E STUDY Or ST. THntAS 157 (1929); D. Rn-
mrAExER, INTRODUCTION TO PBILOsoPir 21 (1948); GIIrsN, R.EAS0 AND REVEIATI0oN pzssi
(1938); ZYUR% PRESENT DAY THINEmS AND TnE NEW ScHOLrAC .ms 206 (1926).
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to "read" nature in the first place. That is why we are able to make
"reading" at all. If they can tell you about the properties of tungsten
or steel or lucite, it is because dumb, silent, understandable things
"spoke" to them.
Scientists found many enigmas. They still find them.3 4 But riddles
can only exist by contrast with the things that are not riddles. It never
occurs to the scientist to conclude that there is no solution simply be-
cause for a time-perhaps for a lifetime-he is unable to solve a particu-
lar problem. He doesn't understand cancer or the vermiform appendix.
That doesn't prevent him from looking patiently for an answer. If you
want to put it that way, he has an unbounded "faith" in the availability
of answers. But if he is to find answers he knows that he must find
them buried in the natures of things. The evidence of the order, harmony
and consistency of Nature is all around him. His vocation is to trace
the lineaments of a rationality in the heart and flux of things. He recog-
nizes ordination. He sees determination of things to definite effects. He
knows that mind, by abstraction, is in contact with reality.
Abstraction is the act of intellect which selects certain aspects or in-
spects of a reality presented to it while leaving others out of considera-
tion. This is not so much a question of a conscious act of exclusion
but rather a concentration on some formalities while prescinding from
others. There could be no such thing as science unless the confusing
welter of individuating notes, contingent circumstances and accidental
pecularities (with which concrete realities bristle) could be disregarded;
thus permitting emphasis on some formal objects having universal or
necessary characteristics. The laws and generalizations of science capture
from reality not every note or phenomenon; but what inheres in reality
by virtue of its form or nature. The inconsequential trivia of accident
and circumstance are ignored. Universal aspects and inspects are the
subjects of science and its generalizations. What is completely indi-
vidualized and unique is not the subject of scientific law.
Ever since the time of Aristotle it has been common to subdivide
knowledge into speculative and practical levels. The practical is itself
divided between Art and Prudence. The speculative has been divided
according to the three degrees15 of abstraction into Natural Philosophy,
34. ". . . We may say that every scientific question presents a double aspect, the one
a Mystery, the other a Problem. . . A mystery in regard to the thing, the object as It
exists outside the mind, a problem in regard to our formulae." MARITAIN, COURT TRAiTE
DE L'EXIsTENCE ET DE L'ExISTANT 4 (Galantier and Phelan transl. (1948)).
35. ST. THowAs AQuInAS, DE TRINITATE, V, 1 (translation by Sister Rose Brennan,
S.H.N., under the title The Trinity and The Unicity of The Intellect at 135 and 136;
Brother Benignus, op. cit. supra 409-410; PTm, s, MODER TrioaNxsTic PmLosoPny II,
140-141 (1935).
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Mathematics and Metaphysics. The vestibule to these three degrees of
abstraction is provided by the experimental sciences. The realities per-
ceived at each level of abstraction themselves imply intellect, order
pattern and law in a sense which is analogous to the use of these words
in connection with artifacts. That is the only rationally conceivable
postulate to the existence of intelligibility, order, law and pattern in the
material objects of physics, mathematics and metaphysics. Intellect is
the Source of intelligibility, order, law and pattern in the material and
formal objects of natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics,
even though such Intellect is analogous to rather than univocal with
human intellect. The process by which human intellect discerns law,
order and pattern as they are appropriate to these three degrees of
abstraction is obvious, if analogical to our process of knowing law and
order in artifacts.
Like artifacts, the realities with which physics, mathematics and meta-
physics are concerned manifest themselves by their objective aspects and
inspects. Motion, sensible things, number, quantitative determinations,
reality as reality, being as being-all these we learn to know in a manner
analogous to our way of knowing artifacts, without help from maker or
expert; i.e., by the self-revelations (made to our minds) by the very
things in question;-the things considered as universal, necessary, spe-
cific natures determined and constituted to be what they are and not
other things.
All through history scientists and less acute observers have realized
that every being is a specific nature. Every reality is of a determinate
nature which constitutes it what it is. It has consistency. It has tough-
ness. It is what it is. It is something definite. It is not nothing."°
It should not require the courage and the curiosity of the ancient
Greek philosophers to use subjects and predicates. But it takes some-
thing of their acumen to analyze and appraise them. The flippant and
superficial modern must use subjects and predicates in order to appear
flippant and superficial. All our certitudes and opinions are adventures
in predication. We are always trying to extricate the exigencies, laws,
and discernabilities from the things around us by classifying, i.e., by
using predicates. We state the purposes of lampposts and television
tubes; of the pituitary glands and of pine tree cones; of stonehenge and
hieroglyphics. Why should they not state the purpose of man? The
artist, the architect, the artisan and the engineer spend their time putting
laws, exigencies and discernabilities into wood, stone and metal. Upon
such things they grave the marks of reason. Thereafter, until these
36. Lurrumn, CouRT TRAITE DE L'ENXI-.,cr wE L'E.ur,? 91-92 (Galantier and
Phelan transi. (1948)).
1950]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
things break or wear away or are corrupted, they are and they function
as natures planned for certain finalities or exemplifying certain tend-
encies. The scientist and the natural philosopher discover inclinations,
exigencies, laws and discernabilities in the natures which man does not
make; which man often finds more baffling and intriguing. Wherever we
turn, whether to the things made by man or not made by man, we
recognize, if we are ingenious and patient enough to learn, laws, exi-
gencies, discernabilities, formal messages which things are in themselves,
in their tendencies, in their functioning. Each separate thing has its
own nature and therefore its own natural law. Why then should one
hesitate about trying to read the communications imprinted in the very
nature of man? It is that nature that gives us the groundwork and the
matrix of the Natural Law. There is a curiosity that lies at the bottom
of the whole idea of the Natural Law. It is a curiosity about the nature
of man. The method of satisfying that curiosity is like the method
applicable to other types of intellectual wonder, in which Aristotle cor-
rectly saW the fecund beginning of all philosophizing. Man, precisely
because he exists and is a unique thing, has a specific constitution or
nature. Unless man were endowed with such a constitution or nature,
it would be impossible to distinguish him from something else. We could
not even talk intelligently about man, if he had no essence; any more
than we can talk intelligently about a toothpick, a wrench or a magnetic
bomb unless we know their natures to some degree. Like inanimate
things, man has an ultimate principle of operation and activity. The
system of communications which man's nature makes to man's mind is
the Natural Law.
Whatever we are able to discern of the pattern, resources and mystery
possessed by human nature, these are parts of the natural law.
The principle of sufficient reason 7 tells us, as a self-evident truth, that
intelligibility goes hand in hand with reality. Unless it did, all science
would be a futility and a superstition. This is not the same as saying
that all things are perfectly transparent to the human intellect. It would
be absurd to contend that human comprehension is never baffled or
transcended. All about the things we know and can know there are
penumbral and black reaches of mystery; even dark depths of infra-
rationality. No truth is better attested by experience or science. Only
for a divine intellect are puzzles and mysteries impossible. 8
37. See note 20 supra.
38. To quote Maritain, "If things are not God, they must comprise a certain measure
of unintelligibility, inasmuch as they originate from nothingness. If in truth Intclliglbility
accompanies being, it is obvious that insofar as anything is affected with nonentity it must
possess a root of unintelligibility. Its relative nonentity is also a relative unintelligibility."
MAr=AwN, COURT TRA=rE DE L'EXISTENCE ET DE L'ExISTANT 102 (Galantler and Phelan
transl. (1948)).
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But the fact of mystery does not convert our lucidities into opacities.
We could not know what a mystery meant, as an intelligible and differen-
tiated essence, except against the background of that which is knowable.
Our truths may be partial, incomplete and inadequate. They are not
therefore untruths. We may never be able to know down to the deepest
root of its intelligibility the nature of man. That simply means that we
can never know fully the Natural Law of man. (Only one MIan "needed
not that anyone should tell him what was in man.") It means that
there are orders and coherences which will always escape our relative and
often myopic vision.
Nevertheless, nature and its inferable law are always related, whether
in mathematical study (geometry) or in experimental sciences (chemistry
or physics) or in philosophy (the analogical character, e.g., of being).
Each thing is a knowable order of part to whole; of functions to finality;
of properties and attributes to substance; of means to end; of inclination
to object; etc. That is why the nature of each thing exemplifies that
thing's law; its design for existing; its code of use or abuse. Indeed
the nature or internal construction of anything which is well made by
man is dominated by and proportioned to an objective finality. It is an
efficient agent. Regardless of mere subjective, psychological motivation
of the maker of that thing, a particular purpose is objectively embodied
in the very nature of the thing. Of course if it is well made and well
designed by a wise maker it achieves the maker's primary purpose
efficiently. If it is poorly made it either fails to achieve the primary
purpose of its maker or it achieves that purpose inefficiently. Whatever
is wisely made has for its basic law of internal and external structure
a wise purpose ordained by its maker. If it is capable of intended or
unanticipated secondary purposes, those purposes are not permitted to
interfere with or thwart this primary purpose. In other words its nature
is never made futile by obstriction of its primary end. The end of the
maker is regulative of his action in making the thing and of the thing's
operations. The end, then, is the law of making. The thing itself is
constructed according to an order required by or consonant with the
maker's finality, if the maker is not a fool.
Now order always implies a relationship of means to end or of part
to whole. Certainly everything that man makes exhibits such a rela-
tionship. That is the very meaning of order. It is also the characteristic
of intellect to impose order: i.e., to dispose means to ends or parts to
wholes. Sapientis est ordinaire.3 0 Only intellect can establish or recog-
nize order. Therefore, to the extent that it exists or is possible, order
presupposes mind, intellect, thought.
39. AIkisToTr, AMETAPHYSICS II, 3; ST. THomS AQunms, Sum=A CoN.=r Gm Is L
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What is here involved is a question of using words correctly and as
usage warrants to signify the intended referent. There can be no doubt
that mind, intellect, thought are involved when human art produces a
work of art or an artifact. It does not matter whether these words are
differently defined and explained by different people. What runs through
all respectable definitions of mind and intellect is this: the processes of
imposition of form or order on raw materials by human art or of detec-
tion of form or order in things;-both of these processes have been
ascribed uniformly and only to mind, intellect, thought. That is why,
to borrow a thought from Chesterton, when we dig down into deep
geologic strata and find the tooth of a' board graven with images of
elks and man, we say that such art is the signature of man (rational
animals) and not of brutes. We never pretend that we have dug down
deep enough to find the tooth of a man graven by a monkey or a fish.
Whether the process leads down from the prior artist to the subsequent
artifact, or up from the artifact to the human observer, it is a unique
process which realism and a right use of words ascribe to intellect or
thought, whatever else the process involves on analysis.
The basic act of intelligence is to seize and to conceive, in its own
peculiar, immaterial manner, being and the real in the particular sensi-
tive and concrete experience; to apprehend, as a mode of being, every
particular and unique experience. True, the act of knowledge is an imma-
nent activity of a knowing subject. But the object known is not a mere
subjective state nor only an idea. What is known directly is the objec-
tively real. Ideas have "automatic" objective references. The subjective
state and the idea are only known reflectively. The primary, proximate
and proper finality of knowing is the conscious possession of the real
as real. The indirect and incidental finality of knowing is the perfection
of the knower by that sui generis superabundance of the person which
growth in knowledge implies. (That is why education is good for man.)
This is true regardless of the level or order of knowledge. Indeed, the
very notion of "order of knowledge" signifies not only orderliness as an
objective characteristic of being, but also a something in which order
inheres and which must be contrasted with nothingness. On the level of
commonplace experience there is the extramental order which comprises
both artifacts and the realities and events of nature. On the level of the
idea, as an internal word, we have conceptual order. The latter sub-
divides in a twofold manner. The ideas which signify beings of nature
and those which signify beings of reason.4" The latter exist only in the
mind. The former have a foundation which exists in nature extra-
mentally. Thus, the knowing process not only grasps the complex and
40. ST. THommAS AQUINAS, IV METAPHYSICA 4, 574 and DE ENTE ET EssENTIA I.
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diverse real as perceived in concrete experience. It gathers out of the
mystery, fertility and scatter of the real manifold that unity of being
and of real order which, as it were, constitute the framework of the
manifold.
Thus, wherever there is order, pattern, or arrangement, intellect (or
mind or thought) is involved either as a cause or as a faculty of recog-
nition. The physical reality of the thing existing outside of its causes
is the source of our knowledge of its order (of part to whole and of
means to end). That order is the law of its own structure, at all times
at least potentially apprehensible to intellect or reason.
The basic definition of law in its most general sense is a rule or order
of mind or reason. Law (whether man-made or God-made) is always
a work of intellect or reason seeking to impose order. There can be
no order, whether made, created or merely recognized, which does not
involve intellect or reason. If this were not so, we have no right to use
such words as mind, thought, intellect, reason. Some kind of order is
always the end and result of effective law. The two cannot be dis-
associated. From this the essentially rational character of every kind
of law is patent. It is a work of reason even when it is morally bad.
Law is a norm measure, design or plan of being, action or passion.4 It
implies a perception and definition of order and relationship. Such per-
ception and definition are only possible to rationality.
All of this and more is concisely and profoundly stated in two self-
evident propositions which the Scholastics use to express the meta-
physical principles of the Natural Law. Actually these statements are
two facets of the same underlying truth: Omne agcns agit broptcr finem;
Operatio sequitur esse. (Every agent acts in view of an end; action is
in conformity with essence or nature.) The Natural Law is derived from
the application of these self-evident truths to the reality we call a human
person.
There could be no agent (agens) which did not possess a particular
determination and perfection constituting it what it is. This is another
way of saying there could be no agent without a particular nature or
actuality of being. Nor could there be an agent which did not have a
characteristic act or operation (operatio).4 This latter is a being, an
41. Passion is here used as a contrast to action in the semse of Aristotle's Categories. Cf.
APMSTOrL, CATEGORLAE 9.
42. Gustafson uses a pregnant text from St. Thomas Aquinas (SUMMA Connam, Gr.TUXS,
MI, 2) to explain this:
"The whole case for final causality might really be put into a very few words....
'If an agent did not tend to some determined effect, all effects would be indifferent to it.
But that which is indifferent to many things would not do any one of them rather than
another. Hence no effect would follow from a contingent agent unless it were determined
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actuality, too. It does not matter for present purposes whether action
(operatio) is transitive (passing from the agent to something outside the
agent) or immanent (remaining within the agent, and perfecting the
agent).
Moreover being, as agent, necessitates determination to an end or a
good. It is not any kind of act or an indefinite kind of act of which the
agent is capable. It is a particular operation and a specific end or good
toward which the agent tends. Indeed operation has no capacity for
being recognized and has no reason for existence except in terms of
some specific end (finis). This end is the good of the agent, considered
as its self-realization. In this sense, the agent's good is the same as the
end of the agent. Residing in the nature of the agent there is a natural
appetency, an affinity, a tendency, an appetite, an inclination, a love,
48
a desire, an urge, a nisus, a hankering44 after one or more definite ends
or good. In this broad sense, every created nature implies an appetite
for some end or some good. It is ordered to something not itself. Qua
being, it has an inherent thrust or inclination to its own proper object.
"Being is love of good. . . .And this love is the very ground of its
action."45
Only because an agent has a particular determination and inclination
(which Maritain following St. Thomas calls "love") can we say that its
nature and the operations flowing from it are stable. That is why cater-
pillars never act like butterflies nor nightingales like elephants. This
determination of being or nature to a particular end is just as obvious
a reality as the being or nature itself. As a determination it is prior to
the agent's act or effect. Nature is presupposed by operation. There
could be no operation without a nature, as its source. Nor could there
be a nature without an operation. The nightingale first is as a thing or
by something which is itself determined to one effect. It would be impossible, therefore,
for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some determined effect which is called its end.'
The end or final cause is, therefore, that to which the agent tends, as to a definite and
determined effect. If it did not have that tendency, its action would be inexplicabl--It
would lack sufficient reason; it would be unintelligible." Gustafson, Thcory of Natural
Appetency, THnE PHIOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAs 62 (1944).
43. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUM-A THEOLOGICA I, 60 and I-II, 26, 1.
44. All of these renderings of what St. Thomas meant by appetitus naturalis.
"... Appetitus naturalis. . . .St. Thomas defines it most generally as nothing but an
inclination on the part of any being towards that to which it is ordained....
"It is rooted, then, in the imperfection of created things. All such desire is a mark of
imperfection, but at the same time a promise and a hope. . . .It is a desire of something
which is missing. At the same time, it is an effort towards its acquisition ... striving for
further actualization. . . ." Gustafson, op. cit. supra note 42 at 68.
45. MAniTA N, COURT TRAITE DE L'ExIsTENCF ET DE: 'EXSTANT 113 (Galantler and
Phelan transl. (1948)).
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nature of determined potencies before it sings. It sings as it does pre-
cisely because it is what it is and not something else. Its nature is
ordained to its type of song. Natural appetency is the proportion and
inclination of nature to its object and operation as implanted and recog-
nized by mind.
The principle of finality (every agent acts for an end) is true of all
reality. Created being confesses its dependence on thought because of
its dependence on a First Cause. Here "thought" is analogous not
iinivocal nor ambiguous in its predication. "But we do at least know
implicitly, as soon as we have stated the principle of finality, that natural
existence depends upon an existence of knowledge, that the action of
objects would be unintelligible if they did not depend upon a thought,
therefore, that at the beginning, at the root of things, in a fashion which
as yet we cannot clearly determine, there is thought. The agent's essence
and its action must be present in a thought on which that essence de-
pends and which conceives it as an ordination or determination to that
action, an ontological inclination to the action, an ontological love of it.
The dynamism of being presupposes knowledge and thought, the forming
Word. We see, then, that at the original formation of things, as it were
their metaphysical womb, there is something analogous to what we call
intellect, though at the outset we cannot determine its nature more
accurately . .4."
Truth for the scientist and for the speculative philosopher is a con-
formity of mind to the object or thing which measures mind and there-
fore truth. The function of intellect is to know an object by jealously
respecting it as it is. Human knowledge is measured by reality or there
is no knowledge. Existents insofar as intelligible (as natures) are the
criterion for truth.
But in human art, where the practical intellect is involved, this rela-
tionship is inverted. The achievable and realizable end, the operable
object, is measured by the practical intellect. The latter directs the reali-
zation of the end. That realization depends upon the end as it is con-
ceived by mind. Thus in art it is not an external thing which directly
and completely measures mind (it may do this partially and indirectly:
46. On the meaning of analogy see ANDERso.,, Tim BoND or BEL=G (1949); P.
ST. TH OAS Aml A.ALOGY (1941). Thought which is divine and thought which is human
possess only an analogical unity. There is a common eseace possessed differently. Here
thought is not ambiguously used so that it means utterly different and unrelated things
when applied to God or to man. Nor does it mean precisely the same thing when applied
in these two ways. Actually it means something partly the same and partly different;
but in such a way that the difference lies within the essence of thought itself instead of
being added to that essence from without.
47. fAmiTmNI, A PREFACE TO METAPHYSICS 118 (1949).
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in representative art). Rather it is mind which measures the thing to
be made. Truth here will depend upon the conformity of the thing
made with the purpose or end of the artist.
To confine natural law to an exposition of the inferences and implica-
tions discoverable in artifacts would indeed be anthropomorphism. But
is it not anthropomorphism to transfer this heuristic process to things
which man has not made and to generalize this process? Can it be
argued that the principle of finality is also true of natural agents like
planets and plants and anthropoid apes? Since man did not make man
are we not illicitly transferringto this unique natural agent (man) a
deduction appropriate only to the things man can make? Unless we see
in all agents, whether natural or artificial, a source of determination to
activity or to effect we can have neither science nor philosophy nor
indeed any knowledge. We not only know things exist. We know the
world of nature as an ensemble of existents. But we know more of these
things than that they exist. We know them as agents; as realities which
act in determinate ways and which are subject to specific passions. When
we do this, we already recognize, no matter in how rudimentary a fashion,
the natures of these things. Also, when we do this we necessarily, if
implicitly, recognize the reality and universality of the principle of
finality. A tree is determined to grow. The bird is determined to flight
and to song. This conception of natures as agents with particular and
limited acts and potencies does not involve the slightest anthropo-
morphism. It is the foundation for all knowledge and science. That is
why principles like "Operatio sequitur esse; omne agens agit propter
finem; potentia dicitur ad actum" I are universally true. They are self-
evident. They are foundations of rationality and intelligibility. They
apply to the things men make and to the things that men do not or cannot
make. If these truths are anthropomorphism, all science is anthropo-
morphism. Unless these principles were universally true, knowledge
would be impossible. Thought itself would be unthinkable. It would
have no finality.
If agents were not determined to ends, the actions of those agents
would have no sufficient reason. Denial of the principle of finality really
means denial of the principle of sufficient reason.
Through the gateways of the senses we learn of the kind of reality
which is capable of change. Now capacity for change or develpoment
presupposes an end or terminus ad quem of change or development.
Every created substance, being in potency to become something other
than it is at present, finds in that "something other" the term of its
48. Operation follows (is conformable to) the being of a thing; every agent acts for
the sake of some end; potency is for the sake of (or is related to) act.
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actual or possible natural action or receptivity. Everything has its own
operation. If it does not exist for its operation, it exists for itself-in-
operation. Nothing can attain its ultimate destiny or actuality except
insofar as it is in act4 9
Man as scientist discovers order in the things of exterior natures.
He also discovers order within his own body. The implantation of that
order in the things of nature and in man's body is certainly not man's
work. It is merely discovered by man. But it is the work of intellect,
however, (regardless of the kind of intellect, for the moment) precisely
because it is the work of an ordering. It is the characteristic of intellect
to arrange things in order. The Intellect Whose ordering is observable
in nature is God. He is the Law-giver, the Designer, the Architect, the
Planner Who created and Whose Providence provides for nature and
its activities.
The genuine natural law tradition is essentially theistic. Creation is
the result of Intellect. That is why our limited intellects can descry some
of the rationalities (order or pattern) which God's Thought, (Which is
identical with Himself) has implanted in Nature (the physical universe
which He created). In the last analysis it is His Intelligence which
makes reality intelligible. Nothing gives what it does not have; out of
nothing nothing comes. Nature has an intelligible content: such a con-
tent can have no explanation outside of intelligent ordering. Such a con-
tent must come from "intelligence". We correctly apply the word,
'intelligence", or the word, "intellect", to the analysis and the establish-
ment of order (e.g. means to ends; parts to wholes; accidents to sub-
stances; matter to form; conclusions to principles; effects to causes;
analysis to synthesis; activity to agent; property to nature). No matter
how we have to correct or adjust the crudities and simplicity of our
notion of intelligence by recourse to the doctrine of analogy, there is
no abuse of language, or of the referents behind language and ideas, in
the attribution of "intelligence" to God as the cause of the intelligent
ordering of nature which we perceive in the cosmos.
The principles and reasoning upon which theism is based are beyond
the scope of this essay. The natural law doctrine is no stronger and no
weaker than the arguments for the existence of God. That is another
way of saying it is no stronger and no weaker than the principles and
the reasoning which underlie all knowledge, being, intelligibility and
Nature.
This God in whom Essence is identical with Existence, Who is pure
Being and pure Act without limitation and without potentiality is recog-
nized by philosophy as well as by religion in the phrase, "I am who am"
49. See ST. T omAs AQumns, Sioxm THEoLOGICA I-Il, 1, 2.
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or "I am he who is." Theodicy does not so much justify the idea and
reality of a Creator as it justifies the being and intelligibility of creatures.
Creatures need an adequate and sufficient reason.
We can only have sound notions of the Natural Law if the concept of
"nature" has objective validity. It is for epistemology and metaphysics
to demonstrate that the concept of nature does have objective validity.
Ideas like those of essence and nature are accessible only to reason, which
abstracts from experience the necessary and the universal content of
experience. If, with the nominalists, we repudiate human nature, nothing
else is left of a natural law. We have so fundamentally tainted the source
of all intelligibility and rationality about man that we cannot consistently
set forth even the nominalist's position. We have infected all knowledge
with a fundamental skepticism. All science and communication between
men fails because the very word science, on the nominalist's hypothesis,
cannot symbolize any real referent.
In a metaphysics which gives universal and necessary validity to the
idea of nature, the idea of a natural law is implicit in the very idea of
a nature. The nature of something is the principle of that something's
activity. Whatever has a nature has its act, direction and law from its
nature. The ideas of law and good and nature imply each other.
There will of course always be an element of obscurity in every theory
of knowledge no matter how true it might be. But then there is an
element of obscurity in all knowledge, no matter how many truths stand
revealed by science. Metaphysical ideas like nature and essence are
primary. As such their certitude and their ontological validity are prior
to any theory by which a psychologist or philosopher seeks to explain
how this certitude is attained; or how intellect comprehends or fails to
comprehend being; or how intellect is determined and measured by
reality. Unless the ideas of nature and essence have objective reality,
the principle of non-contradiction would mean nothing.
Centuries ago Aristotle undermined nominalism by giving eight
reasons50 for defending the necessity and real validity of the principle
of non-contradiction: (1) To deny the necessity and validity of this
principle deprives words of their fixed meaning and renders speech
futile; (2) The ideas of nature and of essence ivould lose all reality and
there would be only an endless process of becoming (which, by way of
contradiction, is itself an essence or a nature or it is nonsense) without
anything constituting the subject of this process of becoming, like flight
without birds or a dream without a dreamer; (3) It would be impossible
to distinguish between things without knowing something of the natures
and essences of those things. Thus there would be no reason for dis-
50. ARISTOTLE, MFTAPHYSICA, III, 3-6.
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criminating between a toothpick and a fence, a penguin and aluminum;
(4) Necessarily there would follow the complete destruction of all truth
and scientific law; (5) Affirmation could not be distinguished from
negation, if we could not understand the natures of these things and all
thought and opinion (which must be by affirmation or negation) would
be destroyed; (6) An indefinite and undefinable absolute indifference
would replace all love and all hatred, all good and all evil. Desire could
not be differentiated from aversion; (7) If the distinction between truth
and error is wiped out it is obvious it would also be impossible to dis-
tinguish between degrees of error. Everything could be both true and
false at the same time; (8) The very notion of becoming as a process
would be impossible. If becoming is conceived as a something then it
could be equivalent, at one and the same time to something and to
nothing.
In summary, the mere attempt to deny the principle of non-contradic-
tion is implicit with its affirmation. And that principle together with
the very raison d'etre of every process of becoming implicates an efficient
cause and a final cause."
The seat of tendencies and the proximate source of ordinations are
the natures of things. Just as there are different natures created by God,
so there are different natural laws, each appropriately expressing a sepa-
rate and identifiable created nature. In much the same way it is possible
to conceive of different times. It would, for example, be possible to
calculate time upon the basis of other movements than those of the earth
around the sun or those of the stars. Though we follow astronomers in
speaking of solar time or sidereal time, anything that moves in a regular
or repetitive fashion could be employed as the basis for computing time.
Similarly, each nature made by God or by man exhibits an order and
law of that nature. It flaunts its own natural law.
Natural Law in jurisprudence refers primarily and uniquely to a
man's nature. That nature is the proximate source and norm of man's
activity; of what is good and bad for men in human conduct. Natural
Law is nothing but the law of man's nature integrally considered, insofar
as it is transparent, translucent or opaque to human intelligence and
reason. The structure or essence of man considered as a whole and as
exemplifying an internal and external order perceivable by our minds
is implicit with a natural law.
Thus the Natural Law reflects human nature considered as a revela-
tion of function and purpose. Although this revelation is divinely dif-
fused in that nature itself, as a divine design; it is purely natural and
not supernatural. It is not Revelation considered as a supernaturally
51. See GA IGou-LAGRAGE, GoD: His ExMascz A.zD His NATum, I, 199, et seq.
1950]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
announced message to man from man's Maker. The source of the reve-
lation with which the natural law is concerned is man's nature, not his
supernature by grace. Nor is the origin of the natural law a matter of
dogmas defined by the Church. It is a matter of first principles intuitively
grasped by the unaided human intellect from the nature of a created
reality. One can attain to a knowledge of it (fumblingly, at least, and
with difficulty) without supernatural enlightenment or education.
Man studies man as a nature, to discern the law constituting that
nature as a design of the Supreme Reason, the First Principle of the
universal, cosmic order. It is a question of making the world and man
himself humanly intelligible. God "intrudes" here as He "intrudes" into
every problem. For the problem of God is the ultimate basis of every
problem confronting the human mind. In the final analysis the problem
of man becomes the problem of God. If you take away God you take
away the world because the world was produced by God. Of course we
cannot by reason know what God is in Himself; but only what He is in
relation to us; or more exactly what we are in relation to Him. "Take
away God, and life and the world are left unfinished, are not defined,
but offer only something relative and insufficient, without ultimate reason
for existence: what may be called a system of nothings....
"Since all causality implies an ultimate principle, we postulate one,
and call it God. When we say God is, we consecrate this postulate to
Him alone, but we do not, properly speaking, qualify its possessor. Our
God is not such a one; were he such, he would be limited ... "
The Natural Law then means the law, that is to say the divine order
and decree structuring the nature of man.
In creating man, God ordained him for a purpose, a finality. He would
be less than God if he ordained man for any purpose less than Himself.
In other words God ordained man for a divine finality.63
Even from the point of view of purely natural knowledge, it is appro-
priate to ask of man not only what is his nature but what is his end.
Nature necessarily implies act and act implies end. If we do not take
our answer to the question of man's purpose from God himself (through
Revelation or through the authority which he designated, namely, the
Church) there remain only two alternatives: (1) We can study man as
Socrates recommended: "Know thyself." (2) We can refuse (because
of indifference, despair, neglect or dogmatic prejudice) the quest of man's
purpose.
Certainly it is not in the tradition of culture, civilization and science
52. SERTILLANGES, FOUNDATIONS or THomISTIc PimosoruY 53-55 passim (1931).
53. ST. THOMAS AQuINAs, SummA CONTRA GENTILEs III, 2, 3, 16-20, 25-26, 37-40, 47-48,
51-54 and 61; BUCKLEY, MAN'S LAST END 13 (1949).
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to neglect such an inquiry. To be merely indifferent about it or to shy
away from it because of its difficulty or because of prejudice is
indefensible.
Natural Law designates the law of the use and abuse of man as known
by the light of natural reason, deriving from and at the same time mani-
festing the natures of man, and of things in relation to men. More
particularly the nature of human beings as persons (who proceed as
determinately constituted from the creative act of God) discloses the
pattern or order called Natural Law. God has instilled in man's nature
a capacity for activities directed to his last end and therefore to the good
of the person as a reality designed by God in a unique manner. In this
view, the Natural Law can be defined simply as a participation by reason-
able creatures (persons) in the eternal law of God. Actually this is
the definition of which St. Thomas Aquinas seems most fond: "The
eternal law is nothing other than the order of divine wisdom according
as it is directive of act and of motion." 4 "The eternal law is the order
(ratio) of divine government."11 "The eternal law is the highest
order.""
The Natural Law and the creation and conservation of the universe
thus appear as aspects or phases of the temporal realization of an eternal
plan wherein all reality is perfectly encompassed and ordered without
violation of human freedom. This eternal plan, whose mysterious scope
and deepest roots are shrouded from us because of our ignorance and
the limitations of our intellect, is known as the Eternal Law. T
Thus the Natural Law is nothing else than the eternal law insofar as
the latter regulates human activity in a manner consistent with man's
nature endowed with free will. In respect to material things and inani-
mate beings, the regulations of the eternal law are the physical laws
of science. In physics the relations between ends and means are purely
54. ST. TxoarAs AQTr=As, SuiraA TnEOOGICA, I-I, 93, 1.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 5.
57. "Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of things which are made by his
art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things
that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of
the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that
art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subject, bears the character of a
law .... Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things, in relation to which
He stands as the artificer to the product of his art. . . . Moreover He governs all the
acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature .... Wherefore as the
type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character
of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due
end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type
of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements." Id. at 1.
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mechanical or physical. In respect of brute animals the eternal law
characteristically manifests itself by the internal necessity which we
call instinct. But the direction of man to his final end is moral. It is
not exclusively mechanical, biological nor instinctive. It does not deter-
mine, it merely obliges the will. But it permits free choice between what
is genuinely good or good in the long run and what is and is recognized
as only apparently good or transiently good.
The nature of a thing conceived according to the maker's plan and
purpose constitutes necessarily and metaphysically the norm of that
thing's functioning. Assuming, as a postulate taken from theodicy, that
the Maker of human nature is good, allwise and omnipotent, the human
person has a nature which achieves its destiny (attains its end) by being
true to the ordered inclinations of that nature. This means giving each
inclination its proper value, scope and due respect, according to the
Maker's plan of integrated and actualized personalty. A wise maker
wants the thing he makes to function as he made it and so as to fulfill
its potentialities. To abuse the thing, to obstruct its functioning or to
develop inordinately one potentiality to the neglect of others amounts
to a repudiation of the maker's plan. A mechanical pencil is to be used
in accordance with the gift of structure, nature and purpose with which
it was endowed by its maker. To use it as a chisel to carve granite would
be to spoil it, to abuse it. Wood will not serve as human food; nor can
a golden calf be divinized. The nature of things forbids such abuse.
Whenever man desires an intelligent explanation of any action whatso-
ever he looks for purpose or ends. Every form of making requires final
causes as much as efficient causes. If a nature did not by some internal
dynamism (whether explainable or not) tend toward its particular type
of action or effect; if it did not have at least a natural inclination toward
that specific action or effect; there would be no sufficient reason why it
would produce one action or effect rather than another. Unless things
directed their functioning by some finality or tendency there would be
universal disorder. One would never know when to expect attraction
rather than repulsion, respiration rather than digestion, vision rather than
audition. There would never be any sufficient reason to account for any
effect or activity. The nature, endowed as it is with its own proper,
specific finality, presents the basic proximate reason why its act is deter-
minate; otherwise, acting indeterminately, it might produce a dozen
other effects rather than the one toward which it has finality. All experi-
ence, science and sound philosophy recognize that every existent, be-
cause it has a specific nature, has a particular orientation of elements or
activities engineered to achieve a particular end or set of ends. The
ordination of elements to end is the manifestation of an internal law
locked up within the nature of the thing by the intelligence which de-
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signed that thing. Rationality opens natures and looks inside to find the
latent law, drawn therein by Intellect. Like so many shells of different
shapes and sizes, natures echo to our minds the resonances of Mind.
The nature and finality of many parts of the body and of many bodily
functions are readily and directly cognizable. We need no dictionary in
order to discover the function of the mouth or nose. Realization of the
purpose and nature of our sense organs is not acquired as we might
acquire knowledge of differential equations. But as to endocrine glands
and hormones much research and discursive reasoning are necessary.
One and the same nature is nevertheless the well-spring of all our knowl-
edge of man under differing formalities.
The same Natural Law that teaches us the use of organs of sense
teaches us obvious examples of their abuse. Eyes, for example, are
destroyed by plunging knives into them. The body is hurt or fatally
wounded by penetrating it with the bullets of a shotgun. There are
rudimentary precepts of bodily safety and personal hygiene that the
most primitive peoples have acquired.
But the mandate implicated in and readable from the nature of man
is not exhausted by a set of rules of bodily integrity and health. Con-
sidered integrally man is more than body. He is a person. 9 He has
potentialities, tendencies and finalities which exceed merely animal func-
tions. The quest of mind and soul for the good, the true and the beau-
tiful is as real as his tendencies toward sensual gratifications. Man has
capacities for the communications of knowledge and love. In the throes
of sensual pleasure, he has the potentiality for self-restraint. On the
one hand obvious limitation; on the other aspiration for the illimitable;
the quest for repose and, in repose, the boredom; the yawning absence
of self-sufficiency and yet the hankering after self-sufficiency; the con-
flict between human mercy and human justice; the tension between
selfishness and charity. In this panorama of flux and counter-flux there
is a unique and characteristic purpose and destiny for manYP
This panorama itself reveals the nature of man, as the immediate
source of our knowledge of man's act and destiny. Each element or
reality in the microcosmos has its proper place. Each has an end or
purpose which it is determined to realize in one way or another, as part
of a total picture, and in accordance with the virtualities and properties
of man's integral nature. Man is a unity. His partial ends and scattered
finalities demand superior unification. Similarly, each element of the
cosmos, having its own peculiar destiny, is ordained to a universal end
which is God Himself. In this view creation appears as the realization
Ss. MiAwn, TuE PERsox Aim TnE Co mo.N GOOD (1949).
59. See the magnificent passage in D'Aacy, S.J., TM3 NATURE Or BEr-E 289-91 (1931).
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of an eternal plan by which all reality is well ordained toward Goodness
itself. This one unifying law implicit in the laws inscribed in the natures
of the elements of the universe is the eternal law. It is eternal because
the Divine Thought, immutable as the Divine Wisdom, is its type and
exemplar. God presides over the universe which He created and which
He conserves. He has traced the paths of things so that each being has
an end required by its own nature. Free things act freely; determined
things necessarily. Therefore moral law or the Natural Law is nothing
other than the eternal law insofar as it regulates the activity of men,
consistently with freedom.
Human freedom is one of the data discoverable in human nature. The
mere fact that man has the ability to choose freely does not imply that
any kind of choice is good, in a sense of benefiting or befitting his nature
or subserving his ultimate purpose. Man can choose to eat or not to eat.
But some kinds of eating and some kinds of fasting are good, others are
bad. If man has freedom of choice (and he has), there is a wrong and
a right use of that freedom. A free man who is impeccable is a contra-
diction, like a square circle. The proximate norm or test of rightness or
wrongness is the human nature integrally conceived as an order of
unified and subservient finalities under a principal finality. Wisdom and
knowledge are not constituted by any kind of knowing. Only the knowl-
edge which perfect man's nature viewed as a whole is said to be good for
a man. Only the kind of willing which consorts with man's rational
nature and end is good for man. Unless there is a right and a wrong
way of exercising freedom of choice we would never be able to distinguish
reasonably between the choices of St. Francis of Assisi and those of a
Hitler. The Natural Law says that choices are to be appraised by com-
parison with the mandate of man's nature viewed as a whole; by refer-
ence to man's highest purpose or destiny in life.
If man were a creature naturally determined to a specific end in the
manner of chemical elements or plants; or if man were determined to
a definite end in the instinctual manner of mere animals; he would fulfill
his nature and the laws of the finality of that nature without free choice.
But since free-will is a datum of his nature, man alone in the visible uni-
verse has (within limits) the perilous choice of complying with or refusing
to comply with the law of his nature.
Only a little introspection and a little experience with other men war-
rants the conclusion that in man a number of purposes or ends seem
to vie for dominance. "I see another law in my members fighting against
the law of my mind" wrote St. Paul. Is man, like other realities (whether
natural or those produced by human art) endowed with a primary pur-
pose but susceptible of secondary or incidental purposes? Indeed men
have sacrificed themselves to violent and unnatural ends. In this criss-
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crossing of sometimes inconsistent ends and purposes is there any over-
mastering destiny to which all other purposes should be subordinated?
Sound Natural Law doctrine answers in the affirmative.
Aristotle reached this conclusion early in his Nichomichean Ethics,
while discussing the objective of moral science. Here, as in most cases,
it is easier to understand the Greek Philosopher in St. Thomas com-
mentary. Let me translate paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 22 from the
Angelic Doctor's In Decem Libros Etiicorum Aristotelis ad Nicho-
michum Expositio: "19. ... Here the Philosopher approaches the task
of demonstrating what principally is the objective of this science ....
First, he shows from the premises that there is some optimum end in
human affairs. All ends are of such a character that we wish other
things (means) on account of those ends and we wish the ends for their
own sakes and not on account of something else. The end we are seeking
is not only good, but it is the best of all ends. And this appears from
the fact that the end for whose sake all other ends are sought is always
more important. . . . But in human affairs it is necessary that there
should be some such end. Therefore, in human affairs there must be
some end which is not only good, but best. 20.... Now, we either ar-
rive at some end which is not desired because of another end or we do
not. If we do, we have established our proposition. If, on the other
hand, we do not find some such end, it follows that every end must be
desired on account of another end. And thus it would be necessary to
proceed ad infinitum. But this is impossible.... Therefore, it necessarily
follows that there must be some end which is desirable for itself alone and
not on account of another end. 21. That it is impossible to proceed
ad infinitum with ends is proved .. .in this way: if we proceed ad
infinitum in desire for ends, so that one end is always desired on account
of another, endlessly: we would never arrive at the point where man
would achieve desired ends. We would, indeed, desire, frustratedly and
in vain, what we could not possibly attain. Therefore, the end of desires
would be frustrated and in vain. But this desire is natural: for . ..
the good is what all things naturally desire. Therefore it follows that
natural desire is pointless and empty. But this is impossible. Because
natural desire is nothing else than the inclination inherent in things from
the very ordination of the first mover (God). Such an inclination cannot
be frustrated. Therefore it is impossible that in ends one must proceed
ad infinitum. 22. And thus it is necessary that there should be some
ultimate end on account of which all other things are desired and which
itself is not desired on account of any other things. And so also it is
necessary that there should be some best (perfect) end for human
affairs. '1
60
60. Lectio II, passizn.
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Natural theology tells us that God necessarily understands Him-
self as the Perfect Good. Such a good if adequately apprehended is
necessarily loved. Love operates through the will. Consequently God
must have volition. In this attribution we must, by the doctrine of
analogy, strip our human categories of all their imperfections and limita-
tions. But the concept of "volition" attributable to God is not erroneous
because analogous.
In God there is no distinction between mover and moved. God is not
act commingled with potency; perfection with perfectability. The divine
intellect, the divine will and the divine essence are identical. God's Will
is not distinct from His Intellect.
While God has brought things into existence by creation, this creation
was not a necessity of His Nature. God truly produced all things by
His Will. Creation was not the result of an impulse of necessity in God's
Nature. God is omnipotent. Therefore He is not determined to this or
that effect. He is undetermined with regard to all effects. For this
reason effects proceed from God according to the determination of His
Will. God as the agent of creation (like every other agent) acted for
an end. That an agent acts for an end is a law of thought and being.
The end is the principle of all functioning and acting. Moreover it is
obviously better for a thing to have been made for an end than to be
made without the intention of achieving any end. Whatever goodness
things have derives only from the fact that they are made for an end
and achieve that end to a greater or a less degree. Therefore God, Who
does everything in the most perfect way, must have made things for an
end.6'
Obviously if man does have an ultimate and perfect end, all his capaci-
ties and natural desires would be fulfilled in the possession of that ulti--
mate end. From this it is clear that man's last end cannot consist in
mere sense perception. For no matter how much we advance in sense
cognition there still remains a natural desire to know other objects yet
in a rational universe, a natural desire cannot be doomed to frustration;
because the natures of things in that kind of a universe are made for
and are proportioned to ends and finalities which are achievable. A
nature functioning for an impossible purpose might betray the limitation
and the ineptitude of its maker. It could never be the work of an
omniscient Maker.62
61. See ST. TnOMAS AQUINAS, COMPENDIUM oF TnEOLOGY, 104-109 passin, (Vollert
transl. (1947)).
62. For these reasons St. Thomas concludes this argument as follows: "Accordingly we
reach our last end when our intellect is actualized by some higher agent than an agent
connatural to us, that is, by an agent capable of gratifying our natural, inborn craving for
knowledge. So great is our innate desire for knowledge that, once we apprehend an effect,
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The thesis that God made man for Himself finds corroboration not
only in revealed religion but also in whatever real knowledge we have
of the process of making and of the relationship between maker and
thing made.
The story of Frankenstein's monster or of the Golem has fascination
for us precisely because it represents the unnatural and horrible event
of the thing made which refuses to serve its maker. Obviously whatever
man makes he makes in some way for himself. It would be both im-
possible and irrational for man to set about a process of making which
consciously and deliberately aims at a production disobedient to his
will as maker. The whole process of making consists in the act of im-
planting into the refractory materials out of which things are made a
form or mechanism of tendency to act in a given, determinate, intended
way. Otherwise the process of making would be irrational and self-
contradictory. It would be a wanting and not wanting at the same time
and in the same respect. Making would be frighteningly unforseeable in
its result. I am not suggesting that man considered as homo faber cannot
make things clumsily and inefficiently so that they disappoint him. But
this clumsiness, inefficiency and disappointment are not intended. It is
simply impossible for a maker to be rational and to intend production
of an artifice planned to defeat his own wishes. In fact and in sound
philosophy, no artifact can say, "Non serviam".
Only rational creatures, gifted with free will, have been endowed by
their Creator with power to enact rebellion. In all God's visible creation
only man has the frightful capacity to thwart his own nature's destiny
and therefore his Maker's Will by corrupting his acts with the privation
called evil. Out of respect for His own gift of free will to the nature
of man God permits this. Evil conduct in free man is not interdicted
by inviolable laws of natural necessity. Why?"'
we wish to know its cause. Moreover, after we have gained some knowledge of the
circumstances investing a thing, our thirst is not assuaged until we penetrate to its essence.
Therefore our natural craving for knowledge cannot be satisfied until we know the first
cause, and that not in any fashion, but in its very essence. This first cause is God. Conse-
quently, the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in his essence."
ST. THOmAs AQuwAS, Com aNDrum or THrooGY 110 (Vollert trans]. (1947)).
63. "The last end of every maker, as such, is himself, for what we make we use for
our own sake; and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else,
it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure or his virtue. Now God is
the producing cause of all things.... Therefore He is the end of all things." Sr. Thom s
AQunrAs, SumsraA Com Gr.nr.zs III, XV
64. ". . .The perfection of the universe requires there should be inequality in things
so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Nox, one grade of goodness is that of
the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can
fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things ...
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Unless there were adverse circumstances, fortitude would have no
meaning. Unless there were things to fear, bravery would signify noth-
ing. Unless men were free (and were persons), there could be no friend-
ship. And that means that by free choice there may and will be (not
must be) enemies. Moral integrity is only possible and laudable because
by free "acts" we, as persons, nihilate, 5 i.e., we posit acts which lack
rectitude or reality which ought to be present. Evil is a privation of
what is due and not a mere negation. A person free but impeccable is
as metaphysically impossible as an empty pail full of water. Without
free persons the universe would lack much being and good: viz., virtue,
friendship, art and all the notable achievements of men. For all genuine
achievement is defeasible. In the line of man's chiefest end man is sub-
ject to failure because of freedom.
In this philosophy, then, man has a primary purpose, a purpose for
which above all others he was made. Man cannot naturally learn of
that purpose directly from his Maker. That would require supernatural
illumination. If man refuses to learn it or cannot learn it from sound
cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some . . . can lose it, as corruptible
things.
". .. The perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings
incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be some which can fail in goodness and thence it follows that sometimes they
do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in good-
ness." ST. THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, 48, 2.
65. MARITAIN, ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF EviL 21 (1942); MARITAIN, ExisTNCE
AND TnE EXISTENT 85 (1948). ". . . If there are in the universe creatures free and intelli-
gent, therefore fallible, it is doubtless because, from the point of view of nature as a
work of divine art. The perfection of the universe as a whole composed of diverse parts,
required that every degree in the scale of being should be filled.
"But if such a universe has been created, having in its bosom intelligent creatures, free
and subject to failure, let us not forget that the end of its creation lies in the universe
of grace ...
"Sin therefore, taken as a disaster of that whole which we call the person, and as an
offense against God . . . isin and the suffering and sorrow which form its retinue are not
permitted for the greater perfection of the machine of the world, but for the consumma-
tion of a work of love which transcends the whole order of the world; they are themselves
connected to the manifestation of divine goodness as transcending the very universe of
creation and expressing itself in the universe of grace and of the transfiguration of love
of created persons become God through participation." MARITAIN, ST. TuOMAS AND Timu
PROBLIM OF Evm 17-18 (1942). In this area as in others, philosophy will always limp.
Ethics and the Natural Law will never be quite enough. They need completion in Theology.
"Restless is the heart of man until it rest in thee" wrote St. Augustine. A supernatural
destiny beckons to man. Supernature calls to nature filling it with a divine unrest. Even
Aristotle recognized that when, in the beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics, having finished
his delineation of true happiness, he had before him a thing not of this earth. The impulse
and the aspiration to perfection are themselves a kind of natural desire for God, as
Highest Good.
AN APPROACH TO THE NATURAL LATV
philosophy or from religion then his only and very precarious source of
knowledge will be his own nature regarded in its totality. I say "pre-
carious" because few men are willing or able to undertake tasks of such
magnitude. A little such knowledge takes long to acquire, if one uses
as "reference book" only human nature often so poorly refracted by
our minds. What man does learn naturally in this area is often tainted
with admixtures of error.
No approach to the Natural Law would be complete without presenta-
tion of what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say on the subject in his Summa
Contra Gentiles. "Whatsoever has a determinate nature must have deter-
minate actions becoming to that nature: since the proper operation of
a thing is consequent upon its nature. Now, it is clear that man has
a determinate nature. Therefore there must needs be certain actions
that are in themselves becoming to man.
"Besides. If a thing is natural to a man, that also must be natural
to him without which he cannot have that thing: for nature is not want-
ing in necessaries. Now, it is natural to man to be a social animal, and
this is proved by the fact that one man alone does not suffice to procure
all the necessities of human life. Consequently whatever is necessary for
the maintenance of human society, is naturally becoming to man: such
as to observe the rights of others, and to refrain from doing them any
harm. Therefore in human acts some things are naturally right.
"Also . . . it is natural for a man to use things beneath him for the
needs of his life. Now, there is a certain measure according to which
the use of the aforesaid thing is expedient for human life, and if that
measure be ignored, a wrong is done to man, as in the inordinate con-
sumption of food. Therefore, certain human acts are naturally right
and some are naturally wrong.
"Again. According to the natural order, the body is on account of
the soul, and the lower powers of the soul are on account of the reason.
Even as in other things matter is for the form, and instruments for the
sake of the principal agents. Now, if a thing be ordered to another, it
should be a help to it and not a hindrance. Therefore it is naturally
right that man should so care for his body and the lower powers of
the soul that they be not a hindrance but a help to the act of reason
and to his own good. If it happens otherwise it will be evil by nature.
Therefore wine-bibbing and feasting; inordinate use of venery which
hinders the use of reason; and submission to the passions which thwart
the free judgment of reason, are all evil by nature.
"Moreover. Those things are natural to every man whereby he tends
to his natural end: while those which are of a contrary nature, are
naturally unbecoming to him. Now . . . man is by nature directed to
God as his end. Consequently those things whereby man is brought to
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the knowledge and love of God are naturally right: and whatever things
have a contrary result are naturally bad for man.
"It is therefore clear that good and evil in human acts result not
only from the prescription of the law, but also from the order of
nature."66
That "order of nature" is the materialization or realization of the
eternal law. It is the tracing that must be read for whatever glimmering
knowledge we have of the natural law.
Thus the theocentric character of the moral law as explained above is
evident not only from the fact that God Himself is the Author of that
"order of nature" (which confesses the Natural Law) but also from the
fact that God Himself is the Summum Bonum, the good and the destiny,
the end and the purpose of man. God Who is all perfect and all wise
could act only because of a perfect reason. Anything less would imply,
in Him, imperfection. God Himself is the only adequate explanation for
the destiny of man and indeed of all things. God's Will which chose
freely to create us is identical with God Himself. No ordinary maker
is this God choosing freely to make us. Precisely because he unerringly
writes His Will in the things He makes, the Natural Law has an invio-
lability which is alien to anything made by man.
The majestic 'proportions of the great Summas of St. Thomas Aquinas
never appear more magnificent than in the stages of argumentation
by which he establishes that all things are directed to one End which
is God.
According to St. Thomas, if God were to act on account of some
finite good, rather than on account of His Own Goodness (as the supreme
end of creation) he would be acting on account of a good different
from Himself. This would imply a good unworthy of Him, a lack in
Him. Precisely because God is infinite and perfect this is impossible.
Therefore in creating man and the cosmos, God acted ad extra in order
to communicate His Own Goodness. Of course the Goodness of God
cannot be communicated to creatures actually or by identity or even
by a specific similitude (God infinitely exceeds His most perfect crea-
ture). It can only be communicated by intimations: by those "vestiges"
or "images" of the Creator which can be found in all creatures. There-
fore God ordained His creatures to the acquisition of His Goodness by
a finite communication, in a manner conformable to the natures of the
things to which that Goodness is communicated. This limited communi-
cation which St. Thomas calls an "assimilation to the divine goodness"
is the true end of every creature as well as the ultimate end in the order'
of finite and created ends.
66. ST. THomS AQuNAs, S miA CONTRA GENTns III, 129.
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But St. Thomas is careful to caution against considering this "assimi-
lation" as if it were some kind of acquisition by God (Who can acquire
nothing, having everything) rather than a communication."7
So mind laboriously follows the tracings of God's writing in man's
nature wherever they lead: to the obvious and the apparent about man's
body; through difficult reasonings to the cold heights of wisdom reveal-
ing, in the obscurities of His blinding Light, man's Uncaused Cause;
along the devious and dark by-ways of man's soul and interiority (where
man is not a part but a whole; not a means, but an end) to a center
of initiative which holds itself in hand by the mastery and the mystery
of the person; and from this center (which is ineffable) we go in all
directions to the contexts and circumstances, where man is not a whole
but a part of that total picture called creation.
Why does mind, restless 'and often discouraged, undertake this life-
time Odyssey? So that we can know the use and abuse of man: the right
and the wrong of his deliberate choices. That is the price s we must
pay for eating the fruit "of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil."'
Man pursues, restlessly and tirelessly, the good, the true and the beau-
tiful. He experiences existence and attains to a knowledge of being as
being because he confronts himself with Transcendant Reality in its
infinite varieties and refractions. As a person, man controls himself. He
dominates himself. If his nature manifests certain inclinations of mind
and body, many of them are subject to his discretion. He can kick
against the goad. He has liberty and free-will. He has election and
choice. If his body exemplifies such functions as sleeping and eating,
he can decide at least (within limits) what and when he shall eat and
where and when he shall sleep. If his nature beckons alluringly in one
67. "An effect must tend toward the end in the way in which the agent acts on account
of the end. But God, Who is the first efficient cause of all things, does not so act that
by His action He acquires something: for He solely is in perfect act .... Creatures,
therefore, are not ordered into God as unto an end for Whom something is acquired, but,
so that from Him they may attain Him, since He is the end." ST. Tno0mzS Aqun:As,
SuaraA Co m GNrms MI, 18 ad jlnemn.
68. "The creature's liability to sin is thus the price paid for the outpouring of creative
Goodness, which in order to give itself personally to the extent that it tranforms into
itself something other than itself, must be freely loved witll friendships$ love and comn-
nunion, and which to be freeely loved with friendship's love and communion must create
free creatures, and which in order to create them free must create them fallibly free.
Without fallible freedom there can be no created freedom; without created freedom there
can be no love in mutual friendship between God and creature; without love in mutual
friendship between God and creature, there can be no supernatural transformation of the
creature into God, no entering of the creature into the joy of his Lord. Sin,--eili-is
the price of glory." MAa~riT, ST. TnomAs MND THE PROBL-M Or Ev L 18-19 (1942).
69. ST. TEomAs AQu , As, Su=A Coa.;- GEaNuas II, 17.
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direction he can refuse the invitation by self-discipline. He can select the
occasions and opportunities for study. If he is enamored with the good
which is real he is sometimes foolishly fascinated with the good which
is only apparent. If he is the apprentice of truth he can also be the
slave of error. In the things of choice he is not determined to oneness
by ineluctable, instinctual drives or impulsions. He is under no physical
necessity to fail or achieve. He can decide for himself with greater or
less facility, painfully or pleasantly. In view of this point and counter-
point, this invitation and repulse, this exacting indeterminacy, what does
it mean to be told to "Act according to your essential nature"; "Be
yourself"; "Do good and avoid evil"; "Love God above all things and
your neighbor as yourself"; "Actualize your potentialities"? These are
the injunctions which best subsume the whole Natural Law. Philosophic-
ally they all mean the same thing.
Certainly they mean more than that we should be true to a nature
devoid of finality or freedom. A man cannot avoid being a man. He
cannot escape his nature. If he could, he could not be classified. He
would be like the imaginings of fairy tales: the pumpkin that became
a mouse or the giant that became a lion. When a man, who has made
some moral or intellectual mistake, is told "Be yourself", it is quite
obvious that he is not being advised to be his existential self, spoiled
and marred by mistakes, failures or sins. On the contrary, the man who
advises, "Be yourself" means this: "If you had genuinely realized the
veritable potentialities of your nature you would have made no mistake,
you would have committed no sin." The very fact that other men (who
have your nature) have avoided these same mistakes or sins is an indi-
cation that it is within your reach; it is one of the capacities of human
nature to avoid mistakes and sins of deliberate choice. You do not say
"Be yourself" to a man who evinces any kind of ignorance, failing or
imperfection. There are some failings that are simply unavoidable, the
human condition being what it is. If a man says he cannot lift ten
thousand pounds he is not scolded for it. He is being precisely himself
when he admits he cannot lift ten thousand pounds. A derisive "Be
yourself" is not hurled at the ordinary citizen who is unable to under-
stand the complicated formulae constituting Einstein's attempt at a
unified field theory. Since the just man falls seven times a day, the
piccadilloes of good men can be overlooked in the total picture of human
nature and conduct. But the man who is a traitor to his family and his
friends is told to be true to himself precisely because he is in potency
to the kind of action which is loyalty, considered as a finality (included
in the supreme finality bending us to God) perfective of human nature.
If human nature had no end, it could not be perfected. If it had no
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destiny or purpose it could not be considered good nor could any good
be done to it, nor any evil.
Considerations like these lead to the realization that the most obvious
thing which can be read from human nature is its perfectability and its
need for perfection. It is not sheer actuality. It is a strange mixture
of potentiality and actuality. It has talents, capacities, potencies. It
exists for the sake of realizing those talents, capacities and potentialities
according to the order of reason. That is only another way of saying
that human nature has its own distinctive good toward which it ought
always be directed. This good is not any merely apparent rather than
real good. The good in question must be genuine; the most genuine of
all goods: God.
Potentialities are not sheer indeterminations. They are directed toward
specific acts. Those acts are related to one another in an order and
hierarchy. Thus acts or realization of ends (development of human
potentialities), in order to be good for man, must take place in an order
of reason, of rational design: God's design ultimately. Proximately man's
reason, by a right conscience, must dictate this design. Good design is
dictated by good conscience; bad designs by evil conscience. Mlan, like
other realities does have a primary purpose as dictated by an all-wise
Creator, and secondary and incidental purposes. The latter must always
be subordinated to the former. The former is an absolute, because God
in His Wisdom is an Absolute. The secondary or incidental purposes
are not absolutes. They can and should be sacrificed for the sake of the
primary purpose.
The principle: Do good and avoid evil, is universal. It cannot be de-
nied or defied when given a metaphysical, as distinguished from a moral,
reading. It is exemplified in every deliberate choice, whether good or
bad. The most evil man in the world does what he does under the aspect
of good, no matter how spurious the good, no matter how transient or
how merely apparent. It is simply impossible to do anything under the
aspect of evil. An accurate reading of human nature as betrayed by
human conduct discloses that man does everything that he does under
the aspect of good. Evil is not a thing, or a principle, or an essence.
This is not to deny the existency of moral evil in the world. Nor is
it the same as saying that knowledge is equal to virtue and ignorance
to vice. Evil men, insofar as they are evil morally, are always preferring
secondary and incidental purposes to primary purposes, short-range
goods to long-range goods, apparent good to real good. If they are sin-
fully ignorant they have picked a comfortable indolence and laziness as
a "good" to be preferred over the arduousness and self-conquest which
are implied in real achievement. If they are beguiled by their emotions
and passions, because many men live by passion rather than by reason,
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they choose some sensual pleasure as a good to be preferred over the
sometimes painful and always difficult effort of the will at self-restraint.
If they give themselves over to hatreds, malevolence and ill-will (e.g.
genocide) they did these things only in terms of some inordinate love
of self or myth or party or race or blood.
When St. Thomas wrote, "This therefore is the first principle of the
natural law that the good is to be done . . .and evil to be avoided,"10
he was merely stating the self-evident principle of the practical intellect.
If you understand the subject and the predicate of this principle its
truth is an intuition which is inescapable. It is impossible to know the
meaning of such words as "good" and "evil" without recognizing the
truth of this principle.
The explicitation of this first principle (and of the various other
formulae which are semantically its equivalent) by way of conclusions
and "determinations" I must leave to a subsequent paper. Such explica-
tion is not included under the title of this essay.
70. ST. TnOMAs AQUINAS, SumA TEEOLOGICA I-I, 94, 2.
